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ABSTRACT: The motivation for secondary school principals in Queensland, Australia, to instigate 
curriculum change coincided with the commencement in 2005 of the state government’s 
publication of school exit test results as a measure of accountability. Aligning the schools’ 
curriculum with the requirements of high-stakes testing is considered by many academics (Luke, 
2007; Pinar, 2004) and teachers (Ward, 2006) as a negative outcome of accountability for 
reasons such as ‘teaching to the test’ and narrowing the curriculum. However, this article outlines 
empirical evidence that principals are instigating curriculum change to improve published high-
stakes test results. Three principals in this study offered several reasons as to why they wished to 
implement changes to school curricula. One reason articulated by all three was the pressures of 
accountability, particularly through the publication of high-stakes test data which has now 
become commonplace in education systems of many Western Nations. 
Introduction 
In the state of Queensland, Australia, where this study took place, a high-stakes Year 12 exit test is 
administered. This is known as the Queensland Core Skills (QCS) Test and is undertaken by 
students from both private and public schools. The test is skills-based and specifically focuses on 
49 common curriculum elements from across the state’s senior syllabuses. Such elements include 
analysis, interpreting graphs, calculating, classifying, and justifying. Unlike high-stakes exit tests 
in other states in Australia, scores from the QCS test are combined with student rankings from 
internal school assessment and a final grade is awarded to the student. The grades of the students 
from each school are combined and school results are released to the public through a major state-
wide media outlet. Such a practice can carry significant or high-stakes consequences for schools, 
as even a minimal risk of atypically poor annual results can have catastrophic and destabilising 
educational and economic effects on the most stable institutions (Kasperson et al., 1998). As a 
consequence, principals are under increasing pressure to risk manage against poor results by 
ensuring their schools’ curriculum takes into consideration the requirements of the high-stakes exit 
test. This requirement has meant that some principals are demanding immediate and focused 
changes to their schools’ curriculum. 
This desire for change has been particularly prevalent in the USA since the passing of the No 
Child Left Behind Act in 2001 and the subsequent increase in school testing. Academics and 
teachers alike have regularly articulated the negatives of high-stakes testing (Amrein & Berliner, 
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2002; Luke, 2007; Pinar, 2004; Ward, 2006) which include: teaching to the test; pressure on 
teachers; restricted enrolments; and a reduction of the curriculum. One such negative is the 
alteration of the curriculum to mirror the requirements of the high-stakes test (Amrein & Berliner, 
2002). Contrary to the above ‘negatives’, curriculum change intended to improve schools’ high-
stakes test performances can be positive (Ladd, 2008). In the case study conducted by Hargreaves 
and Fink (2004), they found that ‘one or two courageous leaders responded to high-stakes testing 
by improving learning …’ (p. 3). In comparing results from high and low stakes tests in the State 
of Florida, Greene, Winters and Forster (2003) found that ‘score levels on high-stakes tests closely 
track score levels on other tests’ (p. 1). Therefore they concluded that ‘if schools are “teaching to 
the test”, they are doing so in a way that conveys useful general knowledge as measured by 
nationally respected low stakes test’ (p. 1). However, much of the literature in the area of high-
stakes testing and school performance suggests that the effects of such a practice can be less than 
positive for the student, the teacher and the school (Rowe, 2000). This study challenges one of the 
perceived negatives: the alteration of the school curriculum to mirror the requirements of high-
stakes testing. 
This study investigated empirical evidence from three schools to establish if, despite the 
perceived negative consequences towards the practice, increasing accountability through high-
stakes testing has led to a change process to align the school curriculum with the needs of external 
high-stakes testing. A case study approach was initiated in which three principals were 
interviewed. Three categories were discerned: increased accountability; pressures of high-stakes 
testing; and curriculum change. Data obtained from the interviews were considered and discussed 
in the light of current literature related to the three categories; accountability, high-stakes testing 
and curriculum change. 
Accountability 
In relation to schools, accountability is defined as being answerable to someone else for what 
happens in the institution. According to Gurr (2008), accountability is one of a principal’s four 
broad leadership responsibilities (the others are learning and teaching, symbolic and cultural 
awareness, and a futures orientation). In his work, Gurr (2008) identifies three levels of 
accountability. First, principals are accountable to the school council and to the government for 
their own performances and for that of their school. Second, principals have to ensure that the 
school satisfies the stated and documented requirements of the school community and of the 
government. Such requirements present themselves in forms such as school reports and reviews. 
Third, the teachers are accountable to principals. This accountability can be established through 
teacher appraisals and the monitoring of performances. The first level of accountability  
accountability to the government  is where this study sits. 
In Australia, as in many other countries, federal and state governments have insisted on 
increased accountability for their financial investments in education. For example, the Victorian 
State Minister for Education, The Hon. Lynne Kosky, announced a ‘tough stand on school 
accountability’ in 2003 (Guy, 2003, p. 1). She made it clear that the government was determined 
to offer challenging curricula with the expectation that students’ results would improve. 
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Furthermore, schools and other educational institutions are coming under increasing legal 
pressures to ensure that students are prepared for external testing, especially in the area of literacy 
(Zirkel, 2008). These pressures have led to schools re-examining claims in their advertising 
literature and official documentation in an attempt to manage the risk of litigation. It has even 
been recognised by the popular media and academic sources that, increasingly, principals are 
being held accountable for the performances of students (AAP, 2007; Hall & Hord, 2001; Starr, 
2008). If Australia follows the United States’ trend of increased litigation, the number of lawsuits 
against schools will inevitably rise. It will become an ever-present feature in the ever-growing list 
of school concerns (AAP, 2007; Fullan, 2001; Perry, 2007; Smeed, 2008). As a consequence, 
principals will need to have a clear understanding of accountability and what their schools’ 
curricula can and cannot deliver. 
High-stakes Testing 
Even though high-stakes tests are standardised tests they differ greatly depending on their focus.  
For example, in Australia, some high-stakes tests are skills based and others test knowledge. An 
important point about high-stakes tests is not so much what is tested but that the results are used to 
make significant educational decisions. Examples of such decisions made on the basis of high-
stakes testing results include: funding allocations; student movement through year levels; teacher 
competency; student enrolment; enrolment screening; and narrowing and targeting of specific 
aspects of the curriculum. The results of high-stakes tests are often published and used by the 
public (Hoff, 2007), educational systems, and governments to make significant educational 
decisions, even to the point of rewarding or sanctioning schools for their academic performance 
(Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Greene, Winters & Forster, 2003). 
Governments world-wide are increasingly monitoring accountability (Flores, 2005; Fullan, 
2001) as it relates to the curriculum through student and school performances in standardised tests, 
which are often high-stakes (Amrein & Berliner, 2002). In the United Kingdom, educational 
policies centre on meeting public and government demands for educational accountability and 
standards monitoring (Rowe, 2000). The government has instituted a program of testing students 
and publishing the resultant data (Rowe, 2000). School league tables are published, showing 
results from national curriculum tests at ages 7, 11 and 14 years, along with scores for the General 
Certificate of School Education (GCSE) (at 16 years old) and AS and A2 levels (at 17/18 years of 
age). 
In the United States, there has been a steady increase in testing since the launch of the 
Soviet’s Sputnik in 1957. The Soviet Union led the United States in the ‘race to space’, causing 
many in the United States, including journalists and politicians, to question what was happening in 
the nation’s schools. There was concern that the achievements of students in US schools were 
falling behind those in other countries, and in the 1970s, this belief led politicians to instigate a 
minimum competency testing movement. States began to rely on tests of basic skills that they 
considered would lead to students achieving the required amount of knowledge needed to be a 
productive citizen (Amrein & Berliner, 2002). 
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The No Child Left Behind Act in the USA has led to increased standardised testing of students 
across the country. However, this Act is not without its critics. Amrein and Berliner (2002) argue 
that there is no clearly identified link between these tests and increased student learning. 
Other criticisms of high-stakes testing include that they lead to increased drop-out rates 
(Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Parkay, 2006), teacher defection from the profession (Ingersoll, 2003), 
and teachers and schools cheating on exams (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Smyth, 2006). Amrein and 
Berliner (2002) also argue that high-stakes testing has had disproportionately negative and 
discriminating effects on the life chances of America’s poor and minority students. Parkay (2006) 
concurs, and raises doubts about the outcomes of such testing. He considers that the drive for more 
testing and the setting of benchmarks in the USA have led to the lowering of standards. Parkay 
(2006) posits the reason for this as School Districts setting benchmarks that also serve as a funding 
indicator. As a result, the districts have the power to downgrade these benchmarks to retain or 
attract funding. 
Regardless of the arguments, this testing trend is likely to continue as it is supported by the 
majority of the US public (Parkay, 2006). Parkay (2006) defends this claim by referring to the 
2004 US Rose and Gallop Poll, which indicated 40% of respondents believed there was the right 
amount of testing in schools, while 22% believed there was not enough. To offset this result, 
Parkay (2006) points out that the percentage of respondents believing there is too much testing has 
increased from 29% in 1997 to 32% in 2004. He also suggests that the figures indicate the public 
is polarised regarding the use of standardised test scores in judging the quality of teachers (49% in 
favour; 47% opposed). The above figures show that high-stakes testing is largely accepted and 
maybe even expected by the public and, therefore, the discourse as it currently stands would give 
weight to the political insistence that students should be tested. With such public support, the use 
of high-stakes testing is unlikely to be discontinued in the USA. 
Not all the relevant literature in the USA criticises the use of high-stakes testing. An example 
of a positive attitude towards testing is Greene, Winters and Forster’s (2003) work on the State of 
Florida’s testing program. Greene et al. (2003) compared results from high- and low-stakes 
(school-based) testing and found that improved performance in high-stakes testing does translate 
into improved performance in low-stakes testing. 
In contrast to the UK and the USA, even after a decade, periods of what Shimizu (2001) 
referred to as ‘educational disarmament’ (p. 193) are still being experienced in Japan, Malaysia 
and Singapore. In Japan and Malaysia, the emphasis is on lessening the intensity of education by 
reducing curriculum requirements and the number of weekly hours students spend at school 
(Rotberg, 2006; Shimizu, 2001). However, it may be asked whether or not this disarmament trend 
will be tolerated if Japan continues to fall from the top position in mathematics and science in the 
OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment rankings. 
In Singapore, student standardised national testing is undertaken at specific intervals 
throughout a 10-year period of schooling. These results are published in league tables, then used to 
stream students within the system and reward schools for their performances (Rotberg, 2006). In 
contrast, students in Japanese public schools do not partake in high-stakes tests until lower 
secondary school, when their test results determine which upper secondary school they will attend. 
Rotberg (2006) and Shimizu (2001) comment that, while education is highly competitive, teachers 
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are not held accountable for students’ scores on standardised tests as they tend to be in the UK and 
USA, and also increasingly in Australia (ABC Newsonline, 2007). 
There are an increasing number of high-stakes testing programs being implemented in all 
Australian states. In Queensland, for example, students in Years 3, 5, 7, and 9 sit for the ‘Aspects 
of Literacy and Numeracy’ Tests, and Year 12 students undertake the Queensland Core Skills 
Test. Low-stakes testing (testing on the basis that no major decisions affecting the school or the 
student are made) is conducted in Years 4, 6 and 9, and is also part of the students’ testing agenda 
in that state. The high-stakes testing allows inter-school and inter-system comparisons and feeds 
the current apparently insatiable public appetite for school and system test data. 
It is clear that high-stakes testing has become a global phenomenon that is placing ever-
increasing pressure on schools (Fullan, 2001). Nations, states, and school districts have 
implemented accountability tools in the form of large-scale testing programs (Perry & McWilliam, 
2007) to monitor school performance and ultimately government investment. A by-product of 
these tests can be that schools are rewarded or sanctioned based on their results (Amrein & 
Berliner, 2002). According to some, this reward/sanction system has caused some institutions to 
be performance rather than learning orientated (Dweck, 1999; Mathers & King, 2001). 
With results from high-stakes test in Australia now being readily available to the public, it 
would appear that, over time, performance patterns are being used to judge schools, their 
effectiveness and their teaching quality (McWilliam, Taylor & Perry, 2007). The tests also 
demand considerable time and energy in the school’s curriculum agenda and greater attention of 
school administrators (Perry, 2006; Pinar, 2004). 
According to a former Commonwealth Government Minister of Education, The Hon. David 
Kemp (1999), high-stakes testing was not just about the performance of students. He has 
suggested that it could be used as a means of monitoring school and teacher standards. As a result 
of government requirements to publish test results on websites, schools are addressing student 
performance as a matter of urgency (McWilliam, Taylor & Perry, 2007). One way of meeting 
these requirements is through changing the curriculum so that it focuses on the requirements of the 
high-stakes tests. 
Under such intense scrutiny, changing the curriculum and linking it closely to the mandatory 
assessment becomes a device to minimise the risk of board, public, parent, and student 
dissatisfaction. McWilliam and Perry (2006) suggest that ‘the price of failing to render the school 
calculable can be very high indeed’ (p. 100). A poor year of academic results can produce public 
reactions that can destroy credibility and destabilise even the most robust of social organisations 
including schools (Perry, 2006; Ward, 2006). As a result of the publication of educational data, 
schools are under increasing pressure to focus on learnings that eventually lead to acceptable test 
data for public consumption (Fullan, 2001). Evidence gathered in the study reported here indicates 
that schools in Queensland are responding to the publication pressures by changing their curricula 
to mirror the requirements of high-stakes tests. 
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Curriculum Change 
Curriculum is a prescribed set of learnings. Who prescribes it and for what reasons it is prescribed 
varies according to context, systems and societies. The learnings outlined by school syllabuses are 
what society, or at least some in society, considers important for young people to know and 
understand. As society changes over time, pressure to change is brought to bear on the curriculum. 
How these pressures are responded to at an individual, school and teacher level varies according to 
the personnel and the context. 
Curriculum change can be considered and enacted in a micro or macro context. On a micro 
level, it constitutes individual or a small group of teachers planning and delivering required 
changes (Beavis, 1997). Curriculum change at the macro level occurs where changes across the 
whole-school’s curriculum are implemented. This study centred on why principals initially wanted 
changes at the macro level in their schools, where evidence suggests that such attempts have met 
with very little success over the past 40 years (Macdonald, 2004; McBeath, 1995; Paechter, 2003). 
Reasons for initiating curriculum change have differed over time. More than a decade ago, 
Razik and Swanson (1995) identified school ownership and governance (in the case of schools, 
governance generally sits with the School Board), the advent of the information age, demographic 
shifts, growing poverty, demands of new market segments such as comparatively new religious 
groups, and school performance as the dominant reasons for curriculum change. Two years later, 
Fullan (1997) added accountability and high-stakes testing to this list. McWilliam and Perry 
(2006) have added the publication of test results and management of risk from public reaction to a 
poor school performance to this ever-growing list. Furthermore, both Razik and Swanson (1995) 
and McWilliam and Perry (2006) identified that the reasons for curriculum change generally 
originate from outside school communities. To establish the links between increased 
accountability, high-stakes testing and curriculum change, this study investigated the reasons why 
three principals enacted curriculum change processes in their schools. 
Methodology 
Data for this research were drawn from a larger case study of the author’s work. This study 
represents her examination – as a researcher – of the work which she previously undertook as an 
external change agent in three schools in Queensland, Australia. It provides a new perspective on 
an innovative and significant curriculum change process as implemented in these schools. The 
schools in this study were independent; two were metropolitan and one was regional. Of the three 
principals, two were undertaking their first 5-year contract as school leaders, and the third was in 
their second principalship. 
A qualitative case study approach was used, as Merriam (1998) suggests that this is the best 
methodology for addressing problems directed at gaining an understanding of a phenomenon to 
improve practice – as was the situation in this study. An interpretative approach was employed to 
analyse data that were obtained from the researcher’s diary and semi-structured interviews. To 
assist in the analysis of the data, the methods of sample diary logging and category construction 
(Merriam, 1988) were used. 
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In undertaking this study, data were collected from two 60-minute interviews with three 
principals (Principal A, B, and C) that were audio recorded and then transcribed independently in 
full. Where possible, evidence was verified with entries from the researcher’s diary. 
To analyse data from the diary, a technique of sample diary logging was adapted from 
Merriam’s (1998) sample interview log analysis. Using this method, elements of the diary entries 
were listed against a description of the event. From this log, data were again re-interpreted and 
progressively reduced to concentrate on the central issues that emerged and re-occurred. 
Interviews were analysed using Merriam’s (1998) technique of category construction. This 
technique aimed to make comparisons and connections within the gathered information by 
adhering to the following stages: isolating and categorising significant features; establishing 
categories by identifying cycles of cause and effect; and establishing themes or relationships 
between categories. In addition, through the use of category construction, the data from each 
interview were initially analysed vertically and coded line-by-line or statement-by-statement, 
according to the participant’s comments. The data were then assigned to categories. 
In an attempt to minimise bias, the identified categories were independently constructed by 
three people: the researcher; an academic colleague; and a middle manager from a school not 
involved in the study. Recurring reasons for curriculum change served as categories. In response 
to the research question under consideration, evidence was found that pressure from the 
publication of test data has influenced principals to change their school curricula to mirror test 
requirements.  . 
To ensure a high degree of trustworthiness, the research was based on the criterion of 
credibility to minimise misunderstanding and misrepresentation (Stake, 1995). This criterion is 
often used for assessing research associated with the constructivist paradigm (Hatch, 2002; 
Lincoln & Guba, 2002). For reasons of credibility, researchers have an ethical obligation. Merriam 
(1998) suggests that credibility is one of the strengths of a case study, as by its very nature it 
attempts to establish how findings match the real-life situation. 
There have been many techniques suggested for establishing credibility in qualitative research 
(Maxwell, 1996): projective questioning (Lee, 2001); long periods in the research field (Merriam, 
1988); multiple sources of evidence; and member checks (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2002; Stake, 1995). Projective questions were used in the semi-structured interviews for this 
case study to establish credibility. According to Lee (2001), such questions are those which project 
the respondent into an aspect of the world that she/he has encountered. They may also describe the 
respondent’s experience. Such questions require the respondent to think about and articulate a 
situation experienced before the interview. Credibility in this instance is gained by asking 
interviewees to draw on their experiences as to why they initiated curriculum change in their 
schools. 
Gathering data from multiple sources of evidence (Lee, 2001) is another way of developing 
credibility. This study used data from two sources: the external change agent’s diary and the 
principals themselves. To further add to the credibility, the process of member checking was 
employed. In this study, random and periodic member checking throughout the data analysis and 
finalising stages of writing (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Ng, 2006; Stake, 1995) took place. 
This case study research on the views of three principals requiring curriculum change was 
undertaken using analysed data from semi-structured interviews. To increase reliability, several 
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procedures were undertaken during the analysis. This analysis led to the unfolding of three major 
categories in the findings, and these are listed in the next section. 
Findings 
This study investigated whether or not increased accountability through high-stakes testing in 
schools as reported by principals has led to curriculum change. Three categories emerged from 
the analysis of the research data. First, all principals spoke of being placed under increasing 
pressures of accountability. Second, all principals mentioned that the publication of test results 
was a specific pressure. And, finally, all spoke about how they reacted to this pressure by 
changing their schools’ curriculum to more closely mirror the requirements of high-stakes testing. 
Increasing pressures of accountability 
This theme was mentioned extensively by all principals. All three principals felt this pressure had 
increased during their times as school leaders. Principal B commented: 
There has been a huge growth in accountability from all sources, parents, school boards, 
but more specifically, governments. We have to do things now that we never had to do 
five or six years ago … Funding for schools is directly linked to quality procedures in 
curriculum … So, increasingly, the federal government is influencing educational 
outcomes in schools, without that policy being driven by educators, and I think principals 
are concerned about that. (PB 11/11/07) 
Principal A recognised the importance of government funding and offered the following 
observations in relation to increased pressures as a result of this: 
I know its [pressure of accountability] increased on me … The bureaucratic stuff is very 
life-sapping, and there is more and more of that. That’s the only basis that I have, and 
conversations with colleagues … We get a lot of government funding. About 80 percent 
of our finance comes from governments. Often funding is tied to an outcome. If we don’t 
comply, the federal government will cut off our funding. I think this accountability is 
going to increase further in the future. There is nothing we can do about it … It’s the 
governments that are driving things, and we are probably now in a phase in education in 
Australia where the influence of the Federal Government has never been greater, and this 
whole move towards centralisation … (PA 14/12/07) 
In relation to the first theme, increasing pressures of accountability on schools, Principal C 
said that they accepted accountability because of the school’s dependence on government funding. 
He stated: ‘Schools are dependent on public monies, and that brings with it accountability … We 
live in an age, too, where accountability is becoming more and more rigorous’ (PC 25/10/07). 
Findings from this first category clearly show that all three principals felt that pressure had 
increased on them during their time in leadership. However, they also recognised that this pressure 
had been compounded because of the publication of test results. 
Pressures from the publication of test results 
The second identified theme from the data related to the increased pressure from government 
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sponsored testing programs and, specifically, the subsequent publication of school performance 
results. Principal A’s comments were especially pertinent:  
All students would love to come out as a little genius. That is unreasonable. The public 
and the school community make judgements about the school from these published 
results. (PA 14/12/07) 
Principal B pointed out the public interest as a result of test result data being released in the media. 
For Principal B: 
Yes it is a pressure, because it’s public … But because we performed well publicly, 
people have seen that, that has lead to very positive images of the school … you need to 
ensure not only that you meet the benchmarks. If you want to be a school of excellence, 
you really need to be demonstrating that there are excellent learning outcomes … for 
someone outside looking in published data carry a weight, and so I’ve had people from 
our community wanting to enrol their child, and when I ask them why, they say it is 
because of the results in the paper. (PB 11/11/07) 
In relation to this second theme, Principal C particularly noted the effects on enrolment patterns if 
the school’s published data was perceived as inadequate: 
Unless we perform academically, the public will not see us as a school that achieves. 
They will then bypass us for better performing schools. There is now a very practical 
impetus to try to enhance your results because expectations are higher these days, and 
people vote with their feet. I had already discerned looking at the enrolment patterns of 
the college that there was a drift at the end of Year 10. I felt that we were being perceived 
as a lovely, warm, welcoming, supportive place, and we had great subjects in the junior 
school that were lots of fun. I think that was attractive to adolescent girls and parents. But 
it seemed when we were hitting the years where education suddenly became really 
serious, those who had particular academic aspirations were starting to look elsewhere. 
So there was a practical impetus to try to arrest that trend … So we are to some extent at 
the mercy of public perception. That’s another reality that you have to deal with. (PC 
25/10/07) 
The researcher’s diary shows the following entries that highlight pressure on principals from 
the publication of school performances. For instance, Principal A was worried because the senior 
results were published in The Courier-Mail [newspaper distributed throughout the state] earlier in 
the week [and the] school has not done particularly well on the league tables. The diary noted: 
[Principal A] is concerned that questions would be asked by [the] board. [Principal A] is 
down on the staff about the results and says that they are going to have to lift their act. 
[A] also said that [they are] going to write to the parents outlining that the School is about 
the education of the whole person not just results in the paper. One of the middle-
managers told me [the researcher] that parents are starting to ask about the results and 
that questions were also being asked at Board level. (9/4/07) 
Evidence from findings in this second category indicates that all three principals feel pressure 
from the publication of test result data. Findings on a specific reaction to this pressure in the form 
of requiring curriculum change are outlined in the third category. 
Curriculum change to mirror the requirements of high-stakes testing 
The third theme highlighted that as a consequence of the above identified pressure, each principal 
saw a need to establish strong links between their schools’ curricula and the demands and 
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requirements of the test. While admitting that the test came with its related pressures, Principal B 
considered the quality of the QCS test as a learning instrument was high.  Therefore s/he was quite 
open to adjust the school’s curriculum to mirror the test requirements. The pressure previously 
articulated by all principals led to their desire to formally structure and control what was being 
taught in the classrooms. Principal B commented:  
There is pressure to change the curriculum to accommodate the government agenda, 
which is about performance and benchmarks and testing … The QCS [Queensland Core 
Skills] test is very, very good. It’s a marvellous learning instrument. There is real good in 
that. We have really been working with our whole staff on what are the fundamental 
principles underlying teaching and learning and assessment of QCS. And then ensuring 
that they’re a part of the curriculum from Year 8. (PB 10/10/07) 
Principal A also expressed a desire for her school’s curriculum to mirror the requirements of high-
stakes testing. She wanted change that directly impacted on student learning and could ‘be seen in 
terms of results. The tested skills will, therefore, have to strongly underpin the curriculum through 
the work programs’ (PA 10/12/07). The following observation was recorded in the researcher’s 
diary: 
[Principal A] said that she was worried about what was being or not being taught in the 
school. She wanted all work programs written to a common format based on the high-
stakes elements. Principal A now has a copy of every work program in folders in her 
office and she seems very happy about it. A said the whole process makes them feel more 
confident and secure about questions that may come her way. (PA 3/10/07) 
 Principal C wanted ‘the curriculum to be rigorous and focused on producing better results’ (PC 
25/10/07). He commented further: 
I had to look at how well the curriculum was actually preparing students for the exit test. 
We were developing some very good preparation for the test programs, but in the end 
they are the icing on the cake. If you haven’t got the cake, the recipe isn’t right, and it 
doesn’t matter how much icing you put on the outside of the cake. It’s not going to 
provide the substance or the flavour that you’re looking for. I thought we have to dig 
deeper than that, and start looking at what we are actually doing in classrooms, day-in 
and day-out, from Year 8 onwards. We started … into the junior curriculum, and I think 
there has been great value in doing that and making change at the junior level. (PC 
25/10/07) 
The above data strongly indicates principals perceive that there is increasing pressure of 
accountability from the publication of high-stakes testing results and in response to this pressure, 
principals in this study were quite open about their desire to have their schools’ curriculum meet 
the test requirements. 
Discussion 
All principals commented on increasing levels of accountability required by governments. 
According to Pinar (2004), governments are increasingly monitoring accountability through 
student and school performances in standardised tests. Nations, states, and school districts have 
implemented accountability tools in the form of large-scale testing programs, audits, targets, 
inspection, or program reviews (Perry & McWilliam, 2007) to monitor school performance and, 
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ultimately, their investment. A by-product of these tests can be that schools are rewarded or 
sanctioned based on their results (Amrein & Berliner, 2002). 
In his interview, Principal A spoke not only about the increased accountability required by 
authorities, but also the energy he as principal needed to devote to this area. The preparation and 
administration of tests demand considerable attention and time in the school’s curriculum and 
increased energy from teachers and school administrators. Taylor (2005) referred to this demand 
for time and energy as attentional economy which he defined as what school administrators have 
to pay attention to. Increasingly, school leaders must focus on testing regimes and risk manage 
their school curriculum. This increasingly demands the attention of principals as they work to 
avoid any potential harm which could impact as a result of a poor performance. As Principal A 
noted, this pressure of accountability is both increasing and ‘life-sapping’. 
Statements from Principals B and C in relation to the publication of test data, draw attention 
to a by-product of the government’s testing programs  that schools are becoming increasingly 
conscious of the public image that comes from the publication of results (McWilliam, Taylor & 
Perry, 2007). Evidence from these interviews suggests that principals feel pressured to address the 
issue of public scrutiny of academic results. Fullan (2001) also drew attention to this matter 
several years ago when he outlined the increasing pressures on principals, particularly throughout 
England and North America. 
Principals B and C also mentioned the importance of good performance for enrolment 
purposes. McWilliam and Perry (2006) write that there can be serious consequences for failing to 
pay attention to this dimension. Therefore, principals are embarking on the business notion of 
protecting their brand. Poor results are perceived as a risk to the institution, as is evidenced by the 
newsletter editorial by Queensland principal, Vicki Ward (2006) (not one of the principals in the 
study), in which she facetiously outlines what she would do in her school if her aim was just to 
ensure acceptable published data: 
I would narrow the curriculum so that the learning diet would suit those students now in 
the school. In particular, I would make sure that a de facto second filter was applied at the 
point of transition from Year 10 to Year 11. I would not offer subjects such as English 
Communication, Pre-Vocational Mathematics, Early Childhood Studies and the like, as 
students who would want to do these would not be in our school. If any had slipped 
through, they would be advised to go to schools which ‘had the courses which would 
cater for their needs’. I would also do away with many of the subjects that middle and 
lower range students were likely to be able to handle. This would mean that these 
students would look at studying such things elsewhere and so ensure that the students 
who stayed were more likely to be capable of doing well at the highly academic offerings 
that remain. (Ward, 2006, p. 1) 
While facetious in nature, Ward’s comments highlight that principals now feel compelled to 
address the pressures that come from the government as a consequence of making test results 
public. 
Each of the principals spoke about judgements made by the public about their school from the 
published data. They appeared very conscious of the negative impact this could have. In fact, to 
combat this potential impact, McWilliam, Taylor and Perry (2007) state that principals are now 
spending up to 20% of their time attending to matters relating to academic performance and school 
reputation. 
12    Judy Smeed 
The responses from the three principals and the literature illuminate a need for principals to 
risk manage their schools against poor performances and an unfavourable public image 
(McWilliam & Perry, 2006). In attempting to achieve this, the principals in this case study chose 
to make adjustments to the curriculum so that it mirrored the requirements of the Year 12 exit test. 
They chose this option even though much of the literature (Amrein & Berliner, 2002) and the 
rhetoric (Klenowski, 2008) suggest that this course of action is educationally unsound. 
In drawing on the above evidence, there is little doubt that all three principals were adamant 
about wanting change or curriculum compliance which met the requirements of the high-stakes 
exit test. This concentration of efforts to prepare students for standardised tests highlights the 
importance of these tests and reflects Goodhart’s Law of ‘what’s counted counts’ (McIntyre, 2000, 
p. 1). It also reflects a reductionist view of education. Perry (2006) describes it as education where 
scores, market appeal and conformity are considered over ‘mission statements that promote 
creativity, flexibility and individuality’ (p. 150). 
By changing the curriculum to meet the pressures of high-stakes testing, Corson (2002) 
suggests that the educational agenda is being driven by a performance culture rather than by a 
learning culture. Dweck (1999) made a clear distinction between these two cultures. She defined 
performance goals as being ‘about winning positive judgment of your competence and avoiding 
negative ones’ (p. 15). On the other hand, she described learning goals as the desire to learn ‘new 
skills, master new tasks or understand new things’ (Dweck, 1999, p. 15). Some authors (Carlson, 
2005; Corson, 2002; Dweck, 1999; Pinar, 2004), including Australians Perry and McWilliam 
(2007), argue that such external pressures tend to have little to do with education and, more 
specifically, learning; instead they have more to do with business outcomes and performance. An 
implication of this performance orientation is a curriculum that is centrally developed and 
monitored, which can ultimately lead to the de-professionalisation of teachers (Bourke, 2008). It is 
reassuring to note that even though the three principals accorded primary attention to the pressures 
of performance, which Apple and Beane (1999) consider part of the principal’s marketing 
responsibilities, they were aware of the distinction between performance and learning. 
In the above discussion, links have been made between the three categories highlighted in the 
analysis of interviews with the principals. These were the pressures of accountability, pressures 
emanating from the publication of schools’ results, and the response from principals to align 
curriculum with high-stakes tests. Though acknowledging this response to accountability pressure, 
the need to recognise the difference between learning and performance remains a significant factor 
for principals when making any decisions about curriculum and high-stakes testing. 
Conclusion 
In responding to the question of whether or not increased accountability through high-stakes 
testing in schools has led to curriculum change, this study drew on relevant literature and 
interviews with three principals. The literature discussed in this article suggests that the practice of 
changing school curriculum to meet the demands of high-stakes testing is educationally 
questionable. However, findings in this research left little doubt that accountability to government 
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has increased, and the subsequent publication of test results has led to schools demanding 
curriculum compliance with the high-stakes tests. 
These finding could be further considered in terms of the ever-present debates about teaching 
to the test and the narrowing of the school curricula. It could be asked if curriculum narrowing is 
necessarily a bad thing, especially if the focus is on skills. The results of this study could also be 
considered further in relation to the notion of the de-professionalisation of teachers. The idea of 
schools being accountable to a higher authority for the money which is invested in them will 
inevitably lead to further curriculum change in an attempt to ensure the best possible test results. 
This then leads to wider implications in relation to the process of educational change. To meet the 
pressures of accountability, curriculum changes will need to be targeted and rapid. This approach 
goes against the current notions of slow, deliberate, inclusive educational change processes in 
schools advocated by many education and education change theorists (Fullan, 2001; Luke, 2004). 
In establishing the links between accountability, high-stakes testing, and curriculum change, this 
study posits that new, faster, and targeted change processes will have to be considered by the 
educational community because of increased pressures on schools and, in particular, school 
leaders. 
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